Language evolved in two stages by Pléh, Csaba
Evolutionary Psychology 
www.epjournal.net – 2014. 12(5): 979-982 
¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯ 
Book Review 
Language Evolved in Two Stages   
A review of Michael Tomasello, A Natural History of Human Thinking. Harvard University 
Press: Cambridge, MA, 2014, 192 pp., US$35.00, ISBN #978-0-674-72477-8 (Hardcover). 
Csaba Pléh, Department of Psychology, Eszterházy Károly College, Eger, Hungary. Email: 
pleh.csaba@ektf.hu. 
Michael Tomasello is co-director of the Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary 
Anthropology in Leipzig, Germany, and his work—combining studies on large apes and 
children—is unparalleled in the field. The theoretically-motivated and brilliant combination 
of infant research, studies on child language, and chimpanzee cognition is a unique mixture 
of the heritage of James Baldwin (1894) and Vygotsky (Luria and Vygotsky, 1992; 
Vygotsky, 1987) in contemporary psychology. His previous synthesis, the now classic 
work (5,000 citations) of Tomasello (1999), argued that it was not culture that would have 
created human learning, but that the evolution-based mechanisms of cultural learning 
created culture itself (Tomasello, 2003). This was supplemented with the message of his 
other successful book, which argued for human uniqueness in general and comprehensive 
cooperation, including information-oriented cooperation, helping conspecifics by sharing 
with them knowledge about the world (Tomasello, 2009). 
The new book is a synthesis of the decade-long experimental work of the Tomasello 
labs with an eye to the theoretical discussions on the origins of the social mind. A 
comprehensive three-level vision is portrayed. The starting point is a characterization of the 
cognitive and social achievements of great apes. The novelty of the new theory is that—
compared to his earlier cultural learning theory—Tomasello now postulates two dramatic 
changes. These changes focus on both the social level and the societal level of cooperation, 
if I may borrow a term from social science theory not actually used by Tomasello himself. 
The first change is social cooperation, based on joint intentionality with occasional 
partners. The second change is the creation of collective intentionality with the advent of 
rule systems of group life. As for communication, the first step is characterized by a rich 
gesture and miming system and bodily communication, whereas the second is characterized 
by the emergence of conventionalized language.  
The entire book, as well as these new conceptions, has a strong reliance on 
understanding the way of life of great apes and our ancestors in order to explain cognitive 
changes. Food-seeking strategies become the motivating forces for underlying changes 
from mere competition towards cooperation.  
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 Let us take a closer look at the two stages! As for the great apes, Tomasello presents 
them as smarter, but at the same time more single-minded, than contemporary evolutionary 
wisdom dictates. They are also assumed to be somewhat smarter than in the similar vision 
promoted by Donald (1991) a generation ago. The great apes, besides being highly event-
based and visually schematic, as Donald proposed, would also have some protologics, 
being able to deal with “and” and “or,” and would be capable of some event- and object-
based inferences, such as (proto) modus tollens : “(1) the shaking cup is silent; (2) if the 
food were inside the shaking cup, then it would make noise; (3) therefore the food must not 
be in the cup (the shaken cup must be empty)” (Tomasello, 2014, p. 19).  
 At the same time, the intentional world of the great apes is solitary and competitive. 
During problem solving, they are hardly learning from each other. They do pay attention to 
each other, but merely to see when they would be able to take away something from the 
others, and when stealing would be hopeless. Great apes, similarly to what Donald (1991) 
has already claimed, do live in an image-based and schematic world of the here and now, 
but according to Tomasello, their representation system is productive and they are able to 
make causal inferences.  
 The specific feature of humans is the existence of joint intentionality. As most 
clearly summarized in the BBS paper of Tomasello and colleagues (Tomasello, Carpenter, 
Call, Behne, and Moll, 2005), humans do have some social behavioral adaptations, like 
gaze following, learning from peers, cooperation, and coordination in problem solving that 
leads to the situation where we are already social learners in infancy. We accomplish tasks 
with common aims, in a joint intentional system, and learn from these interactions. The 
new conception bifurcates the origins of this “social intentionality,” connecting it with the 
assumed ecology. During hominid evolution, a process was initiated roughly 2 million 
years ago, culminating 400,000 years ago in Homo heidelbergensis. Joint foraging, later 
joint hunting, became an ecological necessity due to increasing terrestrial monkey 
competition. The appearance of joint intentions did correspond to this change in lifestyle. 
Joint attention, joint goals, and joint self-control were developed. The very fact of joint 
attention is well documented (see Tomasello et al., 2005), however the timing is somehow 
speculative, as seen by Tomasello himself. In the framework of this joint intention system, 
communication itself has become increasingly full of content. In the world of gestures, 
rudimentary distinctions between communicative force (give it, take it) and content (the 
apple, the stick) has appeared, and alongside this, communicative relevance emerged as a 
cementing force of communication. Gestures and pantomime play a similar role in 
Tomasello’s conception as they did for Donald (1991, 2001). However, Tomasello provides 
a more detailed version of similarity-based pantomimics and its conventionalization, and 
the gradual progression of gestures to “real language.” Shared cognitive perspective and 
shared control were crucial in this process. Incidentally, since we are talking about a lab in 
Leipzig, this vision of how gestures played a central role towards grammar is reminiscent 
of Wundt (1900), whom Tomasello never refers to. Recently, Levelt (2013) has reanalyzed 
Wundt along these lines.  
 In the new vision promoted by Tomasello, joint intentionality and its corresponding 
communication system undergo further refinement, most likely due to the growing size of 
prehuman groups and their intergroup competition. The cognitive aspect of the 
coordination needs of larger groups is the transformation of joint intentionality into 
community-based collective intentionality, accompanied by an increased 
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conventionalization and “we” consciousness. Imitation, already a cognitive possibility of 
apes, becomes a tool of cultural conventionalization. This happens basically according to 
the natural pedagogy framework of Gergely and Csibra (Csibra and Gergely, 2011; Gergely 
and Csibra, 2005). This would also lead to an increasing role of ontogenesis in humans. 
This change of acculturation would be paralleled by a gradual move towards explicit 
communication. The endpoint is a proposition-like organization, differentiating 
illocutionary Force and Content, Attitude and Proposition, and Topic-Focus, Subject-
Predicate within the proposition (pp. 103–104). All of this leads to normative culture and to 
language as we know it today. Tomasello seems to be more careful in proposing a time 
period for these changes towards more explicit communication, compared to the birth of 
joint intentionality. Specifically, the reader misses a detailed interpretation of the 
gesture/sound shift (see Corballis, 2003 for an example). Conventionalization itself can 
certainly be proven on the basis of contemporary sign language data. The idea that 
whatever was originally a discourse function could be grammaticalized can be argued for 
on the basis of child language data from Tomasello (2003) himself. However, a 
reconstruction of the genesis of sound structure from gestures is still missing from this 
complex argumentation.  
 The summarizing chapter entitled “Human Thinking as Cooperation” positions the 
author in the world of contemporary evolutionary conceptions. His engagement with the 
central role of joint intentionality is clear-cut. This is the key for his critique of the different 
modular visions, from EP to Fodor. There has to be a key factor in hominid evolution, and 
that is the social distribution of intentionality leading to coordination. At the same time, this 
rich book mirroring a general vision of Tomasello does not deal much with the brain 
preconditions of hominid evolution (Arbib, 2005; Dehaene and Cohen, 2007, Dunbar, 
2003). On the social side, possible changes in sexual strategies and offspring care are not 
analyzed. In the vision provided by Tomasello, all social relations are interpreted with the 
basic metaphor of competition for food resources and cooperation leading to the access to 
food.  
 These last remarks should not be interpreted as sour notes. Tomasello’s new book 
shall indeed become a new frame of reference for the next decade of research towards 
understanding the genesis of language and culture. Its provocative novelty is the 
evolutionary (re)introduction of a differentiation between social and societal. The temporal 
organization and structure of the assumed second step will see many further refinements 
yet.  
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